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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
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Case No. 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the court of appeals correctly determine that respondent's consent to the 
search of his vehicle was the fruit of the illegal roadblock stop? 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals issued its opinion in State v. Small. 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 
55 (Ut. App. 1992). 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) (1990 Supp.) provides this court with 
jurisdiction to consider a petition for writ of certiorari. Judgment was entered by the 
court of appeals on March 19, 1992. 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath of 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petition for writ of certiorari correctly describes the proceedings in the trial 




THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE CORRECT TEST 
TO DETERMINE IF RESPONDENT'S CONSENT TO THE 
SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE WAS THE FRUIT OF THE 
UNLAWFUL STOP. 
Petitioner urges this court to adopt a two part analysis to determine if evidence 
seized pursuant to a voluntary consent following an illegal stop is subject to the 
exclusionary rule. The test urged by appellee would require the court to first 
determine if the consent is rendered involuntary by the temporal proximity to the 
violation, the absence of intervening circumstances, or flagrant police misconduct. 
Appellee would have the court next determine if the initial violation was so purposeful 
2 
or flagrant that the evidence should be excluded to deter such misconduct. The 
primary problem with this approach is that it disregards the attenuation analysis 
required bv State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). That analysis appears to be 
the majority rule that has been adopted by other courts.1 Second, the analysis urged 
by appellee is essentially a return to the pre-Arroyo standard which allowed a 
voluntary consent to vitiate any prior illegal seizure. That standard was expressly 
rejected by this court. 
In State v. Arrovo, supra, this court held that a two step analysis must be 
applied to determine the admissibility of evidence when there has been an illegal 
search or seizure followed by a voluntary consent. The first issue to be decided is 
whether the consent is in fact voluntary. If the consent is involuntary, then the 
evidence clearly is inadmissible. If there has been a voluntary consent, the court must 
then determine if that voluntary consent resulted from the exploitation of the primary 
illegal stop. The court in Arroyo held that this exploitation issue is determined by an 
analysis of three factors: the temporal proximity of the illegal stop and the granting 
of the consent; the presence or absence of intervening circumstances; and the 
1United States v. Recalde. 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Perez-Esoarza. 609 F.2d 
1284 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bazinet. 462 U.S. 982 (8th Cir.) cert, den. 
409 U.S. 1010 (1972); United State v. Cherrv. 794 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Gooding. 695 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Miller. 821 F.2d 
546 (11th Cir. 1987); State v. Rasheem. 464 So.2d 293 (La. 1985); Reyes v. State. 
741 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987); People v. Boroes. 69 NY.2d 1031, 511 NE.2d 
58 (1987); People v. Odom. 83 (In. App. 3d 1022), 404 N.E.2d 997 (1980). 
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purpose of the flagrancy of the misconduct. If there is a lack of attenuation, then the 
voluntary consent is rendered invalid. 
The analysis urged by petitioner fails to distinguish between the issue of 
voluntariness of the consent and the issue of exploitation or attenuation of that 
consent from the primary illegality. In other words, Arroyo requires courts to first 
answer the question: "Was the consent voluntary?" If that question is answered in 
the affirmative, the next question to be decided, if petitioner's analysis were followed, 
would also be: "Was the consent voluntary?" The practical effect is that a finding 
of voluntariness of the consent would relieve the taint of the primary illegality. Such 
an analysis was explicitly rejected in State v. Arroyo, supra. The only exception to 
this situation would be that a particularly flagrant or purposeful violation requiring 
deterrence of police misconduct. 
In support of this suggested analysis, petitioner relies on Florida v. Rover. 460 
U.S. 491 (1983). In that case, the court held that an arrest made without probable 
cause rendered a subsequent consent involuntary. Petitioner asserts that Rover 
stands for the proposition that any attenuation analysis should focus on the 
voluntariness of the consent. This interpretation of Royer is wrong. The essence of 
the holding in Rover is that the circumstances of an unlawful arrest may be so 
coercive as to render a subsequent consent involuntary. Furthermore, the facts 
related in Royer leave open the question of whether there was a voluntary consent or 
merely an acquiescence to a show of authority. Based on the finding that the 
4 
purported consent was involuntary, the court did not have to reach the issue of 
attenuation or exploitation of the primary illegality. It is inappropriate to apply Royer 
to a determination of the attenuation or exploitation of a voluntary consent from an 
illegal stop. 
Petitioner also urges that there are two approaches followed by the courts in 
applying the attenuation analysis. The first approach focuses on the relationship 
between the consent and the primary illegality. The second approach focuses on the 
police misconduct and the taint resulting from that misconduct. Petitioner 
mischaracterizes this as a mechanical, or "but-for" analysis. It is actually a weighing 
process. Petitioner correctly points out that the second approach, which does not mix 
the consent and the attenuation issues, has been consistently followed by the 
decisions subsequent to Arrovo from the court of appeals. State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 
144 (Ut. App. 1991); State v. Park. 810 P.2d 456 (Ut. App.); State v. Carter, 812 
P.2d 460 (Ut. App. 1992); State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 1105 (Ut. App.) cert. den. 
800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Castner. 179 Ut. Adv. Rep. 11 (Ut. App. 
1992); State v. Godina-Lima. 179 Ut. Adv. Rep. 21 (Ut. App. 1992).2 
Both Park and Sims involved roadblocks that were indistinguishable from this 
case. There was no statutory authority to conduct the roadblocks. The roadblocks 
were approved and organized by local law enforcement officers. Both cases involved 
2The application of this analysis has, in at least one case, resulted in a finding that 
there was sufficient attenuation from the illegal stop and the voluntary consent. 
State v. Castner. supra. 
5 
a voluntary consent to search that was obtained a very short time after the initial 
illegal stop. Likewise, in this case, any consent was obtained within minutes of the 
roadblock stop. In both cases, there were no intervening circumstances between the 
stop and the voluntary consent.3 The roadblock in this case, just as the roadblock in 
Sims, was conducted without authority or law and therefore the search and seizure 
violation was purposeful and flagrant. The holding in both Park and Sims was that the 
illegal roadblock invalidated any voluntary consent by the defendant. Although this 
court has not determined whether certiorari will be granted in Sims, certiorari has been 
denied in Park. 
The final aspect of petitioner's response that needs to be addressed is the 
request to remand the case for further proceedings in the district court to make 
factual determinations. Petitioner notes that the court in Arroyo ordered such a 
disposition. However, the record of the proceedings in Arroyo did not reflect what 
events, if any, occurred between the illegal stop and the purported consent. The 
intervening circumstances have been found to include such things as a release 
from custody, an appearance before the magistrate, discussions with a lawyer, or a 
conviction on an unrelated charge, United States v. Delaadillo-Velasauez. 856 F.2d 
1292 (9th Cir. 1988). Other intervening circumstances that may establish sufficient 
attenuation between the unlawful detention and the voluntary consent have been 
described in the case law: giving of the Miranda warning and allowing the defendant 
to consult with a passenger, United States v. Berry. 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1983), 
Juarez v. State. 708 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), telling the defendant that 
he did not have to consent to the search, Reves v. State, supra, developing probable 
cause from independent sources to justify the detention United States v. Cherry. 
suora. and whether the consent was volunteered or requested, People v. Boraes, 69 
N.Y.2d 1031, 511 N.E.2d 58 (1987). 
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record in this case is indistinguishable from Park. This court should refuse to grant 
the State's petition for writ of certiorari on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals correctly applied the ruling from this court. The petition 
for writ of certiorari should be denied. 
DATED this V^ tdav of June, 1992. 
STEPHE^X. M€CAUGHE 
Attorney for Respondeat 
FR&5 KfiETOS 
Attorney for Respondent 
7 
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